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Abstract—We use observed transmission line outage data to
make a Markovian influence graph that describes the probabili-
ties of transitions between generations of cascading line outages.
Each generation of a cascade consists of a single line outage or
multiple line outages. The new influence graph defines a Markov
chain and generalizes previous influence graphs by including
multiple line outages as Markov chain states. The generalized
influence graph can reproduce the distribution of cascade size in
the utility data. In particular, it can estimate the probabilities of
small, medium and large cascades. The influence graph has the
key advantage of allowing the effect of mitigations to be analyzed
and readily tested, which is not available from the observed data.
We exploit the asymptotic properties of the Markov chain to find
the lines most involved in large cascades and show how upgrades
to these critical lines can reduce the probability of large cascades.
Index Terms—cascading failures, power system reliability,
mitigation, Markov, influence graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cascading outages in power transmission systems can cause
widespread blackouts. These large blackouts are infrequent,
but are high-impact events that occur often enough to pose
a substantial risk to society [1], [2]. The power industry has
always analyzed specific blackouts and taken steps to mitigate
cascading. However, and especially for the largest blackouts
of highest risk, the challenges of evaluating and mitigating
cascading risk in a quantitative way remain.
There are two main approaches to evaluating cascading
risk: simulation and analyzing historical utility data. Cascading
simulations can predict some likely and plausible cascading
sequences [3], [4]. However, only a subset of cascading mech-
anisms can be approximated, and simulations are only starting
to be benchmarked and validated for estimating blackout risk
[5], [6]. Historical outage data can be used to estimate blackout
risk [2] and detailed outage data can be used to identify critical
lines [7]. However it is clear that proposed mitigation cannot
be tested and evaluated with historical data. In this paper,
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we process historical line outage data to form a Markovian
influence graph that statistically describes the interactions
between the observed outages. The Markovian influence graph
can quantify the probability of different sizes of cascades,
identify critical lines and interactions, and assess the impact
of mitigation on the probability of different sizes of cascades.
A. Literature review
We review the previous literature on influence graphs for
power grid cascading outages and related topics. There is
increasing interest in graphs to represent cascading outages,
in which the graph describes the interaction between outaged
components and is not the power grid topology. These graphs
of interactions have differences in how they are formed and
have different names, such as the influence graph, the interac-
tion graph, the correlation network, and the cascading faults
graph. The idea of a graph of interactions can be traced back to
[8] which has a stochastic process at each graph node that in-
teracts with different strengths along the graph edges joining to
that node to the other nodes. Rahnamay-Naeini [9] generalizes
the model of interacting and cascading nodes in [8] to include
interactions within and between two interdependent networks.
This type of interacting particle system model has some nice
properties allowing analysis, but remains a somewhat abstract
model for power system cascading because it is not known
how to estimate the model parameters from data.
Influence graphs in their present form were introduced by
Hines and Dobson [10], and further developed by Qi, Hines,
and Dobson [11], [12]. These influence graphs describe the
statistics of cascading data with networks whose nodes repre-
sent outages of single transmission lines and whose directed
edges represent probabilistic interactions between successive
line outages. The more probable edges correspond to the
interactions between line outages that appear more frequently
in the data. Cascades in the influence graph start with initial
line outages at the nodes and spread probabilistically along the
directed graph edges. Once the influence graph is formed from
the simulated cascading data, it can be used to identify critical
components and test mitigation of blackouts by upgrading the
most critical components [11]–[13].
As well as outages of single lines, cascading data typically
includes multiple line outages that occur nearly simultane-
ously. When the states are single line outages, these multi-
ple simultaneous outages cause problems in obtaining well-
defined Markov chain transitions between states. For example,
if the outage of two lines causes an outage in the next
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2generation, it is hard to tell which line caused the subsequent
outage or whether the two lines caused the subsequent outage
together. To address this, [12] assigns an equal share to the
two lines. The resulting influence graph is then approximated
to enable analysis. Qi [11] assumes that the subsequent outage
is caused by the most frequent line outage. Improving on this
assumption, Qi [14] considers the causal relationships among
successive outages as hidden variables and uses an expectation
maximization algorithm to estimate the interactions underlying
the multiple outage data. In this paper, we solve this problem
in a novel way by defining an additional state for each multiple
line outage. Thus our new influence graph generalizes the
interaction between single lines to multiple line outages, so
we do not need to make assumptions or approximations when
calculating the interactions between two single lines. This
enables a Markov chain to be cleanly and clearly defined.
Considering the different types of graphs of interactions
more generally, there are three methods of quantifying interac-
tions between components which are the edges in the graph of
interactions. First, as explained in the preceding paragraph, in
[10]–[12], the edge corresponds to the conditional probability
of a single line outage given that the previous line has outaged.
Second, in [15]–[17], the edge weight is calculated based on
the line flow changes due to a single line outage applied to
the base case using a DC load flow (In contrast to [10]–
[12] and this paper, this implies that the edge weights do not
change during the cascade.). In Merrill [16], the edge weight
is obtained from the line outage distribution factors. In Zhang
[15] and Ma [17], the directed edge weights are obtained from
both the line flow changes and the remaining margin in the
line the power is transferred to. Then Zhang [15] combines
the directed edges to give undirected edges. On the other
hand, Ma [17] retains the directed edges and also represents
hidden failures by additional nodes. Third, in Yang [18], the
edge corresponds to the correlation between any two lines.
In [19], Carreras constructs a synchronization matrix from
simulation data from the OPA model to identify the lines with
higher overloading probabilities. Other papers [13], [14], [20]–
[22] form their graph of interactions similarly to the above
methods. In this paper, we base the influence graph edges on
conditional probabilities. However, the edges are different than
the edges in [10]–[12] as they directly correspond to transition
probabilities in a rigorously defined Markov chain.
Influence graphs describing the interactions between succes-
sive cascading outages were developed using simulated data
(Zhou [13] is the exception, but [13] differs from this paper
because it applies the methods of [12] to utility data). But
even for simulated cascade data, there remain challenges in
extracting good statistics for the influence graph from limited
data. Hines, Dobson and Qi [10]–[12] estimate the conditional
probabilities of transitions with empirical probabilities. In this
paper, we mitigate the limited historical cascading data by
using a Bayesian method and carefully combining the sparser
data of the later stages of cascading in a sophisticated way.
Various measures are proposed for the identification of
critical components based on the influence graph. [11], [12],
[17], [23] form their specific measures based on their own
influence/interaction graph. Ma [17] uses a modified page-
rank algorithm to find critical lines. Nakarmi [20] forms
the influence graph using methods of both [12] and [18],
and proposes a community-based measure to identify critical
components. [20] compares its measure with other centrality
measures based on network theory, and concludes that its
method performs better than other methods in most cases. In
this paper, our influence graph is a rigorous Markov chain, and
the identification of critical lines is based on the asymptotic
quasi-stationary distribution. The quasi-stationary distribution
has a clear interpretation of specifying the probabilities that
each of the lines is involved in large cascades.
The graph of interactions also provides useful information
about mitigation actions in power system operation. Ju [21]
extends the interaction graph to a multi-layer graph, in which
the three layers reflect the number of line outages, load shed,
and electrical distance of the cascade spread, respectively. This
multi-layer graph is suggested to mitigate cascades in system
operation by providing the critical lines at different states of
cascades. Chen [22] proposes a dynamic interaction graph to
better support online mitigation actions than a static interaction
graph. During the propagation of a specific cascade, this
dynamic interaction graph removes the interactions involving
already outaged lines, and optimal power flow controls the
power flow on the critical lines indicated by the dynamic inter-
action graph. The dynamic interaction graph model reduces the
risk of large cascades more than the static interaction graph.
As expected, the graph of interactions and any conclusions
drawn depend on the outage data from which the graph is
formed. If the outage data is simulated, the selection of initial
system states matters. For example, Nakarami [20] shows that
different system states lead to different influence graphs. In
this paper, we form our influence graph from fourteen years
of public outage data of a specific area, so that our influence
graph reflects the initial faults and states encountered over that
period of time in that power system area. The textbook [24]
includes material on both influence and interaction graphs.
Another related line of research is fault chains. A fault chain
as described in [25] is one cascading sequence of line outages.
Each initial line fault gives a fault chain of lines most stressed
at each step until outage or instability. Usually only the most
stressed or most likely next line outage is selected to form fault
chains. By taking each line in the system as the initial outage
of each fault chain, Wei [23] obtains a set of fault chains using
a branch loading index to select the most stressed next line
to outage. Each fault chain is expressed as a subgraph whose
nodes are transmission lines, and directed edges are branch
loading assessment indexes, and the union of the subgraphs
forms a cascading faults graph. The edge weights depend on
the sum of the branch loading indices, each scaled by the
length of the fault they are in. Then critical lines are identified
according to the in- or out-degree of the cascading faults graph.
Luo [26] also forms a cascading faults graph with weights
depending on load loss in the chain, and then uses hypertext-
induced topic search to select critical lines. The edge weights
of [23], [26] differ from those in influence graphs because
they are not based on conditional probabilities. Li and Wu
[27] combine simulated fault chains into a network and use
reinforcement learning to explore, evaluate, and find chains
3most critical to load shed. In further work, Li and Wu [28]
combine simulated fault chains into a state-failure network
from which expected load shed can be computed for each state
and failure by propagating load shed backwards accounting
for the transition probabilities of the edges. The transition
probabilities are estimated similarly to an influence graph by
the relative frequency of that transition at that stage of the
data. However, in contrast to the practice in influence graphs,
the state transition data for the later stages is not combined
together to get better estimates. Moreover, fault chains differ
from this paper in only considering single line outages one
after another.
There are also approaches to modeling cascading with
continuous-time Markov processes. Wang [29] drives line
loadings with generator and load power fluctuations to de-
termine overloads and outages that change the Markov state
and hence simulate the cascading. Rahnamay-Naeini [30]
constructs, using simulated cascading data and fitted functional
forms, a Markov process with states highly aggregated into 3
quantities, namely the number of failed lines, the maximum of
the capacities of all of the preceding failed lines, and a cascade
stopping index. The aggregated Markov process can model the
time evolution of the cascade and the distribution of cascade
size. In further work, Rahnamay-Naeini reduces the aggregated
model to a discrete time Markov chain and generalizes it
to model cyber and power interdependent network cascading
interactions in [31] and to model operator actions interacting
with cascading in [32].
For another, independent perspective on the literature,
Nakarmi’s review paper [33] surveys various methods of
constructing interaction graphs and the reliability analysis
based on interaction graphs.
B. Contributions of paper
The new influence graph generalizes and improves previous
work in several ways. In particular, this paper
• uses real data observed and routinely collected by utilities
rather than simulated data.
• obtains a clearly defined influence graph that solves
the problem of multiple simultaneous outages by using
additional states with multiple outages. This generalized
influence graph rigorously defines a Markov chain.
• mitigates the problems of limited cascading data with
several new methods; in particular, it combines Bayesian
methods of estimation with elaborate methods of dis-
tinguishing and combining different events. This better
estimates the transition matrices of the influence graph
while matching the increasing cascade propagation and
retaining possibilities of analysis.
• computes the probabilities of small, medium and large
cascades, and these match the historical data statistics.
• makes innovative use of the bootstrap to estimate the
variance of the probabilities of small, medium and large
cascades. This allows checking that the estimated proba-
bilities of small, medium and large cascades are accurate
enough to be useful.
• calculates critical lines most involved in large cascades
directly from the Markov chain as the quasi-stationary
distribution of the Markov chain.
All of these advances clearly distinguish this paper from the
previous work reviewed above.
II. FORMING THE MARKOVIAN INFLUENCE GRAPH FROM
HISTORICAL OUTAGE DATA
We use detailed historical line outage data consisting of
records of individual automatic transmission line outages that
specify the lines outaged and the outage times to the nearest
minute. We emphasize that this data is routinely recorded
by utilities worldwide, for example in the North American
Transmission Availability Data System.
The first step in building an influence graph is to take many
cascading sequences of transmission line outages and divide
each cascade1 into generations of outages as detailed in [34].
Each cascade starts with initial line outages in generation 0,
and continues with subsequent generations of line outages
1,2,3,... until the cascade stops. Each generation of line outages
is a set of line outages that occur together on a fast time scale
of less than one minute. Often there is only one line outage in
a generation, but protection actions can act quickly to cause
several line outages in the same generation. (Sometimes in a
cascading sequence an outaged line recloses and outages in
a subsequent generation. In contrast to [13], [34], here we
neglect the repeats of these outages.)
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Fig. 1. Simple example forming influence graph from artificial data (real
utility data is shown in Fig. 2).
The influence graph represents cascading as a Markov chain
X0, X1, ..., in which Xk is the set of line outages in generation
k of the cascade. We first illustrate the formation of the
influence graph from artificial cascading data with the simple
example of four observed cascades involving three lines shown
in Fig. 1. The first cascade has line 1 outaged in generation
0, line 3 outaged in generation 1, line 2 outaged in generation
2, and then the cascade stops with no lines (indicated by the
1The grouping of line outages into cascades uses the simple method of [34]:
The grouping is done by looking at the gaps in start time between successive
line outages. If successive outages have a gap of one hour or more, then the
outage after the gap starts a new cascade. More elaborate methods of grouping
real line outages into cascades could be developed and applied.
4Fig. 2. The gray network is the system network and the red network is the
influence graph showing the main influences between lines. The red edge
thickness indicates the strength of the influence.
empty set {}) outaged in generation 3. All cascades eventually
stop by transitioning to and remaining in the state {} for all
future generations. The five states observed in the data are
{}, {line 1}, {line 2}, {line 3}, and {line 1, line 3}, where
this last state is lines 1 and 3 outaging together in the same
generation, as in generation 1 of cascade 2. Introducing the
state {line 1, line 3} with two line outages avoids the problems
in previous work in accounting for transitions to and from the
simultaneous outages of line 1 and line 3.
We can estimate the probabilities of transitioning from state
i to state j in the next generation by counting the number
of those transitions in all the cascades and dividing by the
number of occurrences of state i. For example, the probability
of transitioning from state {line 1} to state {line 3} is 1/3 and
the probability of transitioning from state {line 2} to state {line
1, line 3} is 1/2. The probability of transitioning from state
{line 1} to {}; that is, stopping after the single outage of line 1,
is 2/3. The probabilities of the edges out of each state sum to
1. By working out all the transition probabilities, we can make
the network graph of the Markov chain as shown in Fig. 1. The
transitions between states with higher probability are shown
with thicker lines. In this generalized influence graph, the
nodes are sets of line outages and the edges indicate transitions
or interactions between sets of line outages in successive
generations of cascading. The influence graph is different than
the physical grid network and cascades are generated in the
influence graph by moving along successive edges, selecting
them according to their transition probabilities.
In the general case, there are many states s0, s1, ... , and we
describe the transitions between them. Let Pk be the Markov
chain transition matrix for generation k. The Pk matrix entry
Pk[i, j] is the conditional probability that the set of outaged
lines is sj in generation k + 1, given that the set of outaged
lines is si in generation k; that is,
Pk[i, j] = P[Xk+1 = sj | Xk = si]. (1)
The key task of forming the Markov chain is to estimate the
transition probabilities in the matrix Pk from the cascading
data. If one supposed that Pk does not depend on k, a
straightforward way to do this would first construct a counting
matrixN whose entry N [i, j] is the number of transitions from
si to sj among all generations in all the cascades. Then Pk
would be estimated as
Pk[i, j] =
N [i, j]∑
j N [i, j]
. (2)
However, we find that Pk must depend on k in order to
reproduce the increasing propagation of outages observed
in the data [34]. On the other hand, there is not enough
data to accurately estimate Pk individually for each k > 0.
Our solution to this problem involves both grouping together
data for higher generations and having Pk varying with k,
as well as using empirical Bayesian methods to improve
the required estimates of cascade stopping probabilities. The
detailed explanation of this solution is postponed to section VI,
and until section VI we assume that Pk has already been
estimated for each generation k from the utility data. Forming
the Markov chain transition matrix from the data in this way
makes the Markovian assumption that the statistics of the lines
outaged in a generation only depend on the lines outaged in
the previous generation. This is a pragmatic assumption that
yields a tractable data-driven probabilistic model of cascading.
One way to visualize the influence graph interactions
between line outages in Pk is to restrict attention to the
interactions between single line states, and show these as the
red network in Fig. 2. The gray network is the actual grid
topology, and the gray transmission lines are joined by a red
line of the thickness proportional to the probability of being in
successive generations, if that probability is sufficiently large.
The interactions in Fig. 2 reflect a very wide range of mech-
anisms. The longer-range mechanisms include redistributions
of power due to line and generator outages, remedial action
schemes, and bad weather across the grid.
Let the row vector pik be the probability distribution of
states in generation k. The pik entry pik[i] is the probability
that the set of outaged lines is si in generation k; that is,
pik[i] = P[Xk = si]. (3)
Then the propagation of sets of line outages from generation
k to generation k + 1 is given by
pik+1 = pikPk (4)
and, using (4), the distribution of states in generation k
depends on the initial distribution of states pi0 according to
pik = pi0P0P1...Pk−2Pk−1. (5)
5III. ILLUSTRATIVE HISTORICAL OUTAGE DATA
While our method applies generally to the detailed outage
data routinely collected by utilities, we illustrate our method
with a specific publicly available data set, which is the
automatic transmission line outages recorded by a large North
American utility over 14 years starting in 1999 [35]. We group
the 9,741 line outages into 6,687 cascades [34]. Most of the
cascades (87%) have one generation because initial outages
often do not propagate further. There are 614 lines and the
observed cascades have 1094 subsets of these lines that form
the 1094 states s0, s1, ... , s1093. Among these 1094 states,
50% have multi-line outages. And among these multi-line
outage states, about 20% are comprised of lines sharing no
common buses. While in theory there are 2614 subsets of 614
lines, giving an impractically large number of states, we find
in practice with our data that the number of states is less than
twice the number of lines. Note that our statistical modeling
approximates the power grid as unchanging over the time span
of the data [36]. In practice a utility would have the records of
changes to partially mitigate the effects of this approximation.
IV. COMPUTING THE DISTRIBUTION OF CASCADE SIZES
AND ITS CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
We compute the distribution of cascade sizes from the
Markov chain and check that it reproduces the empirical dis-
tribution of cascade sizes, and estimate its confidence interval
with a bootstrap.
We can measure the cascade size by its number of gener-
ations. Define the survival function of the number of genera-
tions in a cascade as
S(k) = P[number of cascade generations > k] (6)
S(k) = 1−pik[0], where pik[0] is the probability that a cascade
is in state s0 = {} in generation k and also the probability
that the cascade stops at or before generation k. Hence
S(k) = 1− pik[0] = pik(1− e0)
= pi0P0P1...Pk−2Pk−1(1− e0), (7)
where 1 is the column vector (1, 1, 1, ..., 1)′, and e0 is the
column vector (1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0)′. The initial state distribution
pi0 can be estimated directly from the cascading data.
Then we can confirm that the influence graph reproduces the
statistics of cascade size in the cascading data by comparing
the survival function S(k) computed from (7) with the em-
pirical survival function computed directly from the cascading
data as shown in Fig. 3. The Markov chain reproduces the
statistics of cascade size closely, with a Pearson χ2 goodness-
of-fit test p-value of 0.99.
We use bootstrap resampling [37] to estimate the variance
of our estimates of probabilities of cascade sizes. A bootstrap
sample resamples the observed cascades with replacement,
reconstructs the Markov chain, and recomputes the probabil-
ities of cascade sizes. Note that each bootstrap resampling
amounts to a different selection of the cascades observed in the
data. The variance of the probabilities of cascade sizes is then
obtained as the empirical variance of the bootstrap samples.
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Fig. 3. Survival functions of the number of generations from real data and
from the Markov chain.
We use 500 bootstrap samples to ensure a sufficiently accurate
estimate of the variance of the probabilities.
The risk of a given size of blackout is estimated as risk =
(estimated probability pˆ of that size of blackout) × (cost of
that size of blackout). Knowing the multiplicative uncertainty
in pˆ is useful. For example, if we know pˆ to within a factor
of 2, then this contributes a factor of 2 to the uncertainty of
the risk. Therefore, it is appropriate to use a multiplicative
form of confidence interval for pˆ specified by a parameter κ.
A 95% multiplicative confidence interval for an estimated
probability pˆ means that the probability p satisfies P[pˆ/κ ≤
p ≤ pˆ κ] = 0.95. The confidence interval for the estimated
survival function is shown in Fig. 4. Since larger cascades
are rarer than small cascades, the variation increases as the
number of generations increases.
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Fig. 4. Survival function of cascade sizes. Red crosses are from Markov chain,
and blue lines indicate the 95% confidence interval estimated by bootstrap.
To apply and communicate the probability distribution of
cascade size, it is convenient to combine sizes together to
get the probabilities of small, medium, and large cascades,
where a small cascade has 1 or 2 generations, a medium
cascade has 3 to 9 generations, and a large cascade has 10 or
more generations. (The respective probabilities are calculated
as 1 − S(2), S(2) − S(9), and S(9)). The 95% confidence
intervals of the estimated probabilities of small, medium, and
large cascades are shown in Table I. The probability of large
cascades is estimated within a factor of 1.5, which is adequate
for the purposes of estimating large cascade risk, since the cost
of large cascades is so poorly known: estimates of the direct
costs of cascading blackouts vary by more than a factor of 2.
6TABLE I
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS USING BOOTSTRAP
cascade size probability κ
small (1 or 2 generations) 0.9606 1.005
medium (3 to 9 generations) 0.0372 1.132
large (10 or more generations) 0.0022 1.440
We now discuss tracking cascades by their number of
generations. The number of generations is the same concept
as the number of tiers in commercial cascading software [38].
Basic to cascading analysis is the grouping of line outages into
successive generations within each cascade. This grouping is
usually done by outage timing as in this paper, or by simulation
loops naturally producing generations of outages. This paper is
structured in terms of these generations, so that propagation is
determined by the probability of a next generation (i.e. the cas-
cade not stopping at the current generation), and cascade size
is measured by number of cascade generations. In contrast,
some previous papers [7], [12], [13], [34] are structured in
terms of the line outages in the generations, so that, according
to the branching process model [34], each line outage in each
generation propagates independently to form line outages in
the next generation. Then the propagation is determined by the
number of line outages per line outage in the previous genera-
tion, and it is natural to use the total number of lines outaged
as a measure of cascade size. While it is not yet clear which
approach is better, there may be some advantages to tracking
cascades by generations rather than line outages. Generations
are simpler and more general than line outages, and can more
easily encompass other outages significant in cascading such
as transformer outages. Also, it may be that the statistics of
the number of generations is more simply described, as in the
Zipf distribution observed in utility data in [39].
V. CRITICAL LINES AND CASCADE MITIGATION
A. The transmission lines involved in large cascades
The lines eventually most involved in large cascades can be
calculated from the asymptotic properties of the Markov chain.
While all cascades eventually stop, we can consider at each
generation those propagating cascades that are not stopped at
that generation. The probability distribution of states involved
in these propagating cascades converges to a probability dis-
tribution d∞, which is called the quasi-stationary distribution.
d∞ can be computed directly from the transition matrices
(as explained in Appendix A, d∞ is the left eigenvector
corresponding to the dominant eigenvalue of the transition
submatrix Q¯1+). That is, except for a transient that dies out
after some initial generations, the participation of states in
the cascading that continues past these initial generations is
well approximated by d∞. Thus the high probability states
corresponding to the highest probability entries in d∞ are
the critical states most involved in the latter portion of large
cascades. Since d∞ does not depend on the initial outages,
the Markov chain is supplying information about the eventual
cascading for all initial outages.
We now find the critical lines corresponding to these critical
states by projecting the states onto the lines in those states.
Let `k be the row vector whose entry `k[j] is the probability
that line j outages in generation k. Then
`k[j] =
∑
i:j∈si
pik[i] or `k = pikR, (8)
where the matrix R projects states to lines according to
R[i, j] =
{
1; line j ∈ si
0; line j /∈ si (9)
Then the probability distribution of lines eventually involved in
the propagating cascades that are not stopped is c∞ = d∞R
and the critical lines most involved in the latter portion of large
cascades correspond to the highest probability entries in c∞.
Fig. 5 shows the probabilities in c∞ in order of decreasing
probability. We identify the top ten lines as critical and as
candidates for upgrading to decrease the probability of large
cascades.
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Fig. 5. Quasi-stationary distribution of transmission lines eventually involved
in propagating cascades. Red dots are ten critical lines.
B. Modeling and testing mitigation in the Markov chain
A transmission line is less likely to fail due to other line
outages after the line is upgraded, its protection is improved, or
its operating limit is reduced. These mitigations have the effect
of decreasing the probability of transition to states containing
the upgraded line, and are an adjustment of the columns of the
transition matrix corresponding to these states. The mitigation
is represented in the Markov chain by reducing the probability
of transition to the state s containing the upgraded line by
(r/|s|)%, where |s| is the number of lines in the state. The
reduction is r% if the state contains only the upgraded line,
and the reduction is less if the state contains multiple lines.
We demonstrate using the Markov chain to quantify the
impact of mitigation by upgrading the ten lines critical for
large cascades identified in section V-A with r = 80%. The
effect of this mitigation on cascade probabilities is shown in
Fig. 6. It shows that upgrading the critical lines reduces the
probability of large cascades by 45%, while the probability of
medium cascades is slightly decreased and the probability of
small cascades is slightly increased.
To show the effectiveness of the method of identifying
critical lines, we compare the mitigation effect of upgrading
critical lines and upgrading ten random lines. Randomly
upgrading ten lines only decreases the probability of large
cascades by 11% on average.
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Fig. 6. Cascade size distribution before (red) and after (light green) mitigating
lines critical in propagating large cascades.
So far we have only considered upgrading the lines critical
for propagating large cascades. Now, in order to discuss
this mitigation of large cascades in a larger context, we
briefly consider and contrast a different mitigation tactic
of upgrading lines that are critical for initial outages.
Since initial outages are caused by external causes such as
storm, lightning, or misoperation, they often have different
mechanisms and different mitigations than for propagating
outages. A straightforward method to identify lines critical
for initial outages selects the ten lines in the data with the
highest frequencies of initial outage [13]. Upgrading these
ten lines will reduce their initial outage frequencies and
hence reduce the overall cascade frequency. In the Markov
chain, this upgrading is represented by reducing in the first
generation the frequency of states s that contain the critical
lines for initial outages by r/|s|%, where r = 80%. The
main effect is that by reducing the initial outage frequencies
of the critical lines by 80%, we reduce the frequency of all
cascades by 19%. In addition, this mitigation will change the
probabilities of states pi0 after renormalizing the frequencies
of states. It turns out for our case that there is no overlap
between critical lines for initial outages and for propagation.
Changing the initial state distribution pi0 has no effect on
the distribution of cascade sizes in the long-term. However, it
directly reduces the frequency of all cascades. In contrast, mit-
igating the lines critical for propagating large cascades reduces
the probability of large cascades relative to all cascades but
has no effect on the frequency of all cascades. (Note that Fig. 6
shows the distribution of cascade sizes assuming that there is
a cascade, but gives no information about the frequency of all
cascades.)
In practice, a given mitigation measure can affect both
the initial outages and the propagation of outages into large
cascades. The combined mitigation effects can also be repre-
sented in the influence graph by changing both the initial state
distribution and the transition matrix, but here it is convenient
to discuss them separately.
This paper aims to select the lines critical for large cascades
and quantify the impact on cascade probability of generic
upgrades to these lines. Once the critical lines are selected,
an engineering process of much wider scope is required to
determine the possible approaches to upgrade each of the lines,
quantify the benefits other than reducing large cascades and
balance the costs and feasibilities of the upgrading approaches
against the total benefits of upgrading. One part of this process
is that for each line, the percentage reduction in outage
probability for the best approach to line upgrade is estimated
and the Markov chain is used to quantify the corresponding
reduction in large, medium, and small cascade probabilities.
However, cascade mitigation is only one of the many factors
to be considered in justifying upgrade. Evaluating and costing
specific upgrading approaches for specific lines requires utility
expertise, including details of the line construction and right
of way, maintenance history, and operation.
VI. ESTIMATING THE TRANSITION MATRIX
The Markov chain has an absorbing first state s0 = {},
indicating no lines outaged as the cascade stops and after the
cascade stops. Therefore the transition matrix has the structure
Pk =

1 0 · · · 0
uk Qk
 (10)
where uk is a column vector of stopping probabilities; that
is, uk[i] = Pk[i, 0]. Qk is a submatrix of transition prob-
abilities between transient states which contains the non-
stopping probabilities. The first row of Pk is always e′0, so
the transition probabilities to be estimated are uk and Qk for
each generation k. The rows and columns of Pk are indexed
from 0 to |S|−1 and the rows and columns of Qk are indexed
from 1 to |S| − 1, where |S| is the number of states.
As summarized in section II after (1), we need to both
group together multiple generations to get sufficient data and
account for variation with generation k. The statistics of the
transition from generation 0 to generation 1 are different
than the statistics of the transitions between the subsequent
generations. For example, stopping probabilities for generation
0 are usually larger than stopping probabilities for subsequent
generations [13]. Also, the data for the subsequent generations
is sparser. Therefore, we construct from counts of the number
of transitions from generation 0 to generation 1 a probability
transition matrix P¯0, and construct from the total counts of
the number of transitions from all the subsequent generations
a probability transition matrix P¯1+. Specifically, we first use
the right-hand side of (2) to construct two corresponding
empirical transition matrices, and then we update stopping
probabilities by the empirical Bayes method and adjust non-
stopping probabilities to obtain P¯0 and P¯1+. Finally, we adjust
P¯0 and P¯1+ to match the observed propagation rates to obtain
Pk for each generation k.
A. Bayesian update of stopping probabilities
The empirical stopping probabilities are improved by an
empirical Bayes method [40], [41] to help mitigate the sparse
data for some of these probabilities. Since the method is
applied to both P¯0 and P¯1+, we simplify notation by writing
P¯ for either P¯0 or P¯1+.
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transition counts N [i, j] is
P¯ counts[i, j] =
N [i, j]∑
j N [i, j]
(11)
We construct P¯ from P¯ counts in two steps. First, Bayesian
updating is used to better estimate stopping probabilities and
form a matrix P¯ bayes. Second, the non-stopping probabilities
in P¯ bayes are adjusted to form the matrix P¯ to account for the
fact that some independent outages are grouped into cascading
outages when we group outage data into cascades.
We need to estimate the probability of the cascade stopping
at the next generation for each state encountered in the
cascade. For some of the states, the stopping counts are low,
and cannot give good estimates of the stopping probability.
However, by pooling the data for all the states we can get
a good estimate of the mean probability of stopping over all
the states. We use this mean probability to adjust the sparse
counts in a conservative way. In particular, we form a prior that
maximizes its entropy subject to the mean of the prior being
the mean of the pooled data. This maximum entropy prior can
be interpreted as the prior distribution that makes the least
possible further assumptions about the data [42] [43].
a) Finding a maximum entropy prior: Assuming the
stopping counts are independent with a common probabil-
ity, the stopping counts follow a binomial distribution. Its
conjugate prior distribution is the beta distribution, whose
parameters are estimated using the maximum entropy method.
Let stopping counts Ci be the observed number of transi-
tions from state si to s0 (i = 1, ..., |S|−1). Then Ci = N [i, 0].
Let ni =
∑|S|−1
j=0 N [i, j] be the row sum of the counting ma-
trix N . The stopping counts Ci follow a binomial distribution
with parameter Ui, with probability mass function
fCi|Ui(ci|ui) =
ni!
ci!(ni − ci)!u
ci
i (1− ui)ni−ci (12)
The conjugate prior distribution for the binomial distribution is
the beta distribution. Accordingly, we use the beta distribution
with hyperparameters β1, β2 for the stopping probability Ui:
fUi(ui) = B(β1, β2)u
β1−1
i (1− ui)β2−1 (13)
where B(β1, β2) =
Γ(β1+β2)
Γ(β1)Γ(β2)
. Alternative parameters for the
beta distribution are its precision m = β1 + β2 and its mean
µ = β1β1+β2 . The entropy of the beta distribution is
Ent(m,µ) = lnB(mµ,m(1− µ))− (mµ− 1)ψ(mµ)
− (m(1− µ)− 1)ψ(m(1− µ)) + (m− 2)ψ(m) (14)
where ψ(x) is the digamma function.
We want to estimate hyperparameters β1, β2 to make the
beta distribution have maximum entropy subject to the mean
being the average stopping probability of the pooled data uˆ =
(
∑|S|−1
i=1 ci)/(
∑|S|−1
i=1 ni). Then we can obtain hyperparame-
ters β1, β2 by finding the m > 0 that maximizes Ent(m, uˆ)
and evaluating β1 = muˆ and β2 = m(1 − uˆ). The hyperpa-
rameters used for P¯ bayes0 are (β1, β2) = (2.18, 0.32), and the
hyperparameters for P¯ bayes1+ are (β1, β2) = (1.10, 0.93).
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Fig. 7. Stopping probabilities before and after Bayesian updating
b) Updating the observed data using the prior: The
posterior distribution of the stopping probability Ui is a beta
distribution with parameters ci + β1, ni− ci + β2. We use the
mean of the posterior distribution as a point estimate of the
stopping probability:
P¯ bayes[i, 0] = E(Ui|Ci = ci) = ci + β1
ni + β1 + β2
(15)
Fig. 7 shows a comparison between the empirical stopping
probabilities and the updated stopping probabilities. Black
dots are the empirical probabilities sorted in ascending order
(if two probabilities are equal, they are sorted according to
the total counts observed). Red dots are the updated stopping
probabilities. As expected, the empirical probabilities with the
fewest counts move towards the mean the most when updated.
As the counts increase, the effect of the prior decreases and
the updated probabilities tend to the empirical probabilities.
Equation (15) forms the first column of P¯ bayes. Then the
nonstopping probabilities in the rest of the columns of the
P¯ counts matrix are scaled so that they sum to one minus the
stopping probabilities of (15) to complete the matrix P¯ bayes:
P¯ bayes[i, j] =
1− P¯ bayes[i, 0]∑|S|−1
r=1 P¯
counts[i, r]
P¯ counts[i, j], j > 0 (16)
This Bayesian updating is applied to form P¯ bayes0 for the first
transition and P¯ bayes1+ for the subsequent transitions.
B. Adjust nonstopping probabilities for independent outages
The method explained in section II that groups outages
into cascades has an estimated 6% chance that it groups
independent outages into cascading outages [36]. These 6%
9of outages occur independently while the cascading of other
outages proceeds and do not arise from interactions with other
outages. The empirical data for the nonstopping probabilities
includes these 6% of outages, and we want to correct this.
Therefore, the non-stopping probabilities are modified by
shrinking the probabilities in transition matrix by 6%, and
sharing this equally among all the states. That is,
P¯ [i, j] = 0.94P¯ bayes[i, j] +
0.06
|S| − 1(1− P¯
bayes[i, 0]) (17)
where P¯ bayes indicates the transition matrices after the
Bayesian update of section VI-A. Notice that P¯ is a probability
matrix since
∑
j P¯ (i, j) = 1 for each i. A benefit is that
this adjustment makes the submatrix Qk have non-zero off-
diagonal entries, making P¯ irreducible.
C. Adjustments to match propagation
The average propagation ρk for generation k [34] is esti-
mated from the data using
ρˆk =
Number of cascades with > k + 1 generations
Number of cascades with > k generations
=
S(k + 1)
S(k)
=
pik+1(1− e0)
pik(1− e0) (18)
An important feature of the cascading data is that average
propagation ρk increases with generation k as shown in
Table II. To do this, we need to form transition matrices
for each of these generations that reproduce this propagation.
We define a matrix Ak to adjust P¯0 and P¯1+ so that the
TABLE II
PROPAGATIONS OF GENERATIONS k = 0 TO 17
k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ρˆk 0.13 0.31 0.44 0.61 0.73 0.70 0.78 0.75 0.71
k 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
ρˆk 0.73 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.75 0.83 0.60 0.67
propagation in Pk matches the empirical propagation for each
generation up to generation 8. For generation 9 and above,
the empirical propagation for each generation is too noisy
to use individually and we combine those generations to
obtain a constant transition matrix. That is, P0 = P¯0A0,
P1 = P¯1+A1, ... , P8 = P¯1+A8, P9+ = P¯1+A9+.
Then the transition matrices for all the generations are
P0,P1,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6,P7,P8,P9+,P9+,P9+, ....
The matrix Ak has the effect of transferring a fraction of
probability from the transient to stopping transitions and has
the following form:
Ak =

1 0 ... 0
ak 1− ak ... 0
...
. . .
ak 0 ... 1− ak
 (19)
ak is determined from the estimated propagation rate ρˆk as
follows. Using (18), we have
ρˆk =
pikP¯Ak(1− e0)
pik(1− e0) = (1− ak)
1− pikP¯ e0
1− pike0 (20)
and we solve (20) to obtain ak for each generation k.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We process observed transmission line outage utility data to
form a generalized influence graph and the associated Markov
chain that statistically describe cascading outages in the data.
Successive line outages, or, more precisely, successive sets
of near simultaneous line outages in the cascading data cor-
respond to transitions between nodes of the influence graph
and transitions in the Markov chain. The more frequently
occurring successive line outages in the cascading data give a
stronger influence between nodes and higher transition proba-
bilities. The generalized influence graph introduces additional
states corresponding to multiple line outages that occur nearly
simultaneously. This innovation adds a manageable number
of additional states and solves some problems with previous
influence graphs, making the formation of the Markov chain
clearer and more rigorous.
One of the inherent challenges of cascading is the sparse
data for large cascades. We have used several methods to
partially alleviate this when estimating the Markov chain
transition matrices, including combining data for several
generations, conservatively improving estimates of stopping
probabilities with an empirical Bayes method, accounting for
independent outages during the cascade, and matching the
observed propagation for each generation. The combined effect
of these methods is to improve estimates of the Markov chain
transition matrices. Although some individual elements of
these transition matrices are nevertheless still poorly estimated,
what matters is the variability of the results from the Markov
chain, which are the probabilities of small, medium and large
cascades. We assess the variability of these estimated prob-
abilities with a bootstrap and find them to be estimated to a
useful accuracy. This assessment of variability is necessary for
getting useful estimates of large cascade probability because
large cascades are rare, and probability estimates for rare
events have the potential to be so wildly variable that they
are useless.
The Markov chain only models the statistics of successive
transitions in the observed data. Also, there is an inherent
limitation of not being able to account for transitions and
states not present in the observed data. That is, the common
transitions and states and some of the rarer transitions and
states will be present in the data and will be represented in
the Markov model, while the rarer transitions and states not
present in the data will be neglected. However, the Markov
chain can produce, in addition to the observed cascades,
combinations of the observed transitions that are different than
and much more extensive than the observed cascades. The
Markov chain approximates the statistics of cascading rather
than reproducing only the observed cascades.
We exploit the asymptotic properties of the Markov chain
to calculate the transmission lines most involved in the propa-
gation of larger cascades, and we show with the Markov chain
that upgrading these lines can significantly reduce the proba-
bility of large cascades. Since a large cascade of line outages
with many generations is very likely to shed substantial load,
mitigating large cascades will also mitigate blackouts with
large amounts of load shed.
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A Markov chain driven by real data incorporates all the
causes, mechanisms, and conditions of the cascading that
occurred, but does not distinguish particular causes of the
interactions. However, once the lines critical to large cascades
have been identified with the influence graph, the causes
related to outage of those particular lines can be identified by
analyzing event logs and cause codes. Also, the overall impact
on cascading of factors such as loading and weather can be
studied by dividing the data into low and high loading or good
and bad weather and forming influence graphs for each case.
While the Markov model is driven by historical data in this
paper, the Markov model is not limited to historical data. The
Markov model could be driven by simulated cascades or a
combination of simulated and historical cascades. Moreover, if
the probabilities of specific cascading interactions between line
outages are available, these probabilities could be combined
into the entries of the Markov transition matrices. The Markov
chain is applied here to cascading transmission line outages,
but the formulation would apply generally to process real or
simulated data for the cascading outage of components within
or between networked infrastructures.
We show how to estimate the Markov chain from detailed
outage data that is routinely collected by utilities. Being driven
by observed data has some significant advantages of realism.
In particular, and in contrast with simulation approaches,
no assumptions about the detailed mechanisms of cascading
need to made. Since the Markov chain driven by utility
data has different assumptions than simulation, we regard the
Markov chain and simulation approaches as complementary.
The Markov chain driven by observed data offers another
way to find critical lines and to test proposed mitigations of
cascading by predicting the effect of the mitigation on the
probabilities of small, medium, and large cascades.
APPENDIX A
DERIVING THE QUASI-STATIONARY DISTRIBUTION d∞
The quasi-stationary distribution can be derived in a stan-
dard way [44], [45]. Let dk be a vector with entry dk[i] which
is the probability that a cascade is in nonempty state si at
generation k given that the cascade is propagating, that is
dk[i] =
P[Xk = si]
P[Xk 6= s0] =
pik[i]
1− pik[0] , i = 1, ..., |S|
Then the quasi-stationary distribution is d∞ = limk→∞ dk.
Diagonal entries of Q¯1+ corresponding to P¯1+ are all zero
and all other entries are positive. According to the Perron-
Frobenius theorem [46], Q¯1+ has a unique maximum modulus
eigenvalue µ, which is real, positive and simple with left
eigenvector v′. By normalizing v′, we make v′ a probability
vector. We write w for the corresponding right eigenvector.
Moreover, 0 < µ < 1 and µ is strictly greater than the
modulus of the other eigenvalues of Q¯1+. Suppose the cascade
starts with probability distribution pi0 (note that pi0[0] = 0).
According to (5), the probability of being in state i at genera-
tion k is pik[i] = (pi0P0P1...Pk−2Pk−1)[i] = (pi0P (k−1))[i].
In particular, the probability that the cascade terminates by
generation k is pik[0] = pi0P (k)[0] = pi0P (k)e0. Then for
i = 1, ..., |S|,
dk+1[i] =
pik+1[i]
1− pik+1[0] =
(pi0P
(k))[i]
1− pi0P (k)e0 =
(pi0P
(k))[i]
pi0P (k)(1− e0)
The first row of Pk is always [1 0 ... 0]. Since pi0[0] = 0,
let pi0 = [0 p¯i0]. Then pi0P (k)(1 − e0) = p¯i0Q(k)1 and
(pi0P
(k))[i] = (p¯i0Q
(k))[i] for i = 1, ..., |S|. And Q(k) =
Q¯0Q¯
k−1
1+
∏k
m=0(1− αm), so that d∞ = limk→∞ dk+1 is
d∞ = lim
k→∞
p¯0Q
(k)
p¯0Q(k)1
= lim
k→∞
p¯0Q¯0Q¯
k−1
1+
∏k
m=0(1− αm)
p¯0Q¯0Q¯
k−1
1+
∏k
m=0(1− αm)1
=
p¯0Q¯0µ
k−1wv′
p¯0Q¯0µk−1wv′1
= v′
where Q¯(k−1) → µk−1wv′ as k → ∞. Therefore, the
dominant left eigenvector of Q¯1+ is d∞.
For our data, the top three eigenvalues in modulus are
µ = 0.502 and −0.136 ± 0.122 i with corresponding moduli
0.502 and 0.381.
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